Policy Continuity in the Face of Governmental Change in Poland
Sandford F. Smith
Winter/95-96
Prof. Babinski
Introduction
Internal Sources of Policy Continuity
External Sources of Policy Continuity
Conclusions and Prospects for the Future
Bibliography
Endnotes
Introduction
Several aspects of Central Europe have puzzled Western and Eastern scholars since the transition in 1989. Western scholars outside of Germany are just now expanding their knowledge of the region and treating it as something other than a small satellite of the Soviet Union. Eastern scholars are just now able to write with complete freedom and only recently have had access to unmanipulated and systematically collected statistical data.
One aspect that has received little attention despite its abnormality in Eastern or Western experience is the unusual continuity of policy, both domestic and foreign, in Central European governments. In some states, such as the Czech Republic, this is understandable given the stability of government since the transition from socialism. However, most states have had a quite different experience. Poland is exemplary of this type. There has been just over one new prime minister per year since 1989, and in 1993 the government changed from a majority coalition of post Solidarity parties to a coalition led by the successor to the Communist party of Poland, the SLD. In November 1995, the SLD's candidate for president, Aleksander Kwasniewski, narrowly won an the election, beating perhaps Poland's best-known politician in history, Lech Walesa.
Despite this electoral and governmental turmoil, there has been significantly little change in the fundamentals of governmental policy, either foreign or domestic. Domestic policy has been characterized by a consistent push toward reforming the economy, keeping to the intent, if not the letter of the plan developed several Western economists1 and initially implemented by Balcerowicz.
Foreign policy has shown an even more remarkable stability. The different governments and presidents of Poland have shown virtually no difference in the two major strategies of Polish foreign policy: integration with Europe by means of joining the European Union and NATO. Each new prime minister, especially after SLD assumed leadership of the governing coalition in 1993, has stressed that these fundamental goals remain unchanged.
President Kwasniewski spent much of his available time before and after the election assuring both Poles and Westerners that he remains committed to economic reform and Poland's Westward course. In an interview before the November election in Wprost, Kwasniewski emphasized that "[i]n coming years, one of the main tasks for Poland is preparation for integration with NATO and the EU."2
Such continuity of policy in the context of political change is highly unusual. Other states have experienced continued economic performance while undergoing drastic political changes. South Korea since the mid-1970's has suffered coups and electoral instability, but has consistently maintained high rates of growth. Brazil has had great political instability but in the past few years has made great strides in economic reform. However, in each of these cases, significant policy changes accompanied the change in government. In the West, despite their claim to be models of political stability, important political changes have occurred regularly. American foreign policy in the early 1980's after Reagan's election and British domestic policy in the late 1970's with the election of Thatcher exhibited large policy swings despite relatively normal political changes. However, Poland and other Central European countries have had a nearly unique experience since leaving the Eastern Block. What can account for this stability in the face of such change?
Internal Sources of Policy Continuity
Several forces that act to keep both domestic and international policy stable arise from inside Poland. These sources of continuity include the lack of experience with democracy both on the part of the general populace and political elites. Despite Poland's history of democratic experiments and the façade of elections and participation in party structures during the socialist period, few, if any living Poles can remember voting in a free election before 1989. Nor have Poles had experience forming truly independent political parties in that time. These difficulties, together with an often overlooked true consensus on several political issues, act to keep domestic and foreign policy unchanged.
Lamentowicz notes that the legacy of Poland's past, particularly its socialist past, is one of an inexperienced polity--both the electorate and the anti-Communist elites.3 In fact, given the novelty of the multiparty democratic system, even the postcommunist political elites can be said to be inexperienced in many important aspects of democratic politics.
The inexperience of the electorate contributes to policy continuity in two main ways. With little knowledge of how to express discontent with current policies in meaningful ways through the electoral process, the electorate lacks ways to communicate its desires to political elites. In the last election, many people who voted for a right-wing or left-wing candidate in the first round voted for the candidate from the opposite side of the political spectrum in the second round. The confusion over personalities and programs that characterized that election also complicated previous elections and is symptomatic of an inexperienced polity. Politicians receive confusing messages from voters, and in the lack of clear direction from definable interest groups in society, they do not engage in large-scale changes.
If these policy elites receive confusing and contradictory messages from voters, it may be because they provide few clear choices from which the voters may select. Party structures and traditions in Poland are still very weak. Poland's political parties--especially on the right--began to seriously fragment after 1990. Now, a large number of extremely small parties based upon personalities rather than comprehensive programs vie for electoral support. For example, PSL has managed to serve in both post-Solidarity and post-Communist coalitions.
Even in the presidential election, which pitted the post-Communist candidate Kwasniewski against the former hero of Solidarity, Walesa, showed the lack of political development in the Polish political spectrum. The candidates' competing programs differed mainly in marginal adjustments of the reform process and promises to run the government more competently than the other side.
Given the lack of strong native political structures or programs, voters have not had an election that allowed them to choose candidates largely from the differing programs they offer. Election debates and choices in Poland have dealt with rhetoric and personality rather than political philosophy or strategy. As a result, the policies implemented in 1990 have been largely unchallenged. This lack of an internal force for change does not exist in a vacuum, however.
The economic conditions in which the political system operates are also not conducive to generating popular support for policy change. Greskovits notes that populist economic movements have occurred when growth has begun following a large recession, thus raising expectations of future wealth and limiting patience with current economic hardships. Until 1993, there were no states in Central Europe showing positive economic growth, and the Czech republic only achieved 0% GDP growth in 1994. Despite the macroeconomic growth in Poland and Hungary, the continuing economic dislocations and the presence of large budget deficits--that made any attempt at internal financing of populist economic programs seem ludicrous--canceled the effects of growth.4 Even if politicians had offered Gierek-style programs of easing economic hardship, they would not meet a public or an economy ready to receive them. The poor performance of extreme candidates in the 1995 presidential election demonstrated the lack of fertile ground for "easy solutions" to economic problems.
External Sources of Policy Continuity
The aforementioned internal sources of policy continuity work with external sources to create Poland's unusual policy stability. The lack of democratic experience and confidence in developing original alternative programs leads both the inexperienced electorate and policy elites to fill the ideological vacuum with the one strong policy alternative available: the Western-generated plan for economic reform. The search for policy competence also enhances the Polish drive to join "experienced" capitalist and democratic institutions, such as the EU and NATO.
However, some forces for continuity exist entirely independent of Poland's political situation. Foremost of the external actors working to affect Polish domestic policy are the debt-relief agreements of the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Poland's large outstanding debts and current negative trade balance make the continued flow of IMF and other Western credit essential. As has been its policy first in Central and South America and now in Central Europe, the IMF uses its leverage to insist that Poland keep to several budgetary and economic policies. Poland has to limit its social welfare in favor of lowering budget deficits, must adopt certain anti-inflationary policies, and has to meet other reform criteria. It has proved extremely effective in using Poland's dependence on credit to insure these policies are followed in the majority of cases.
The fact of Poland's broadly-supported policy of integration with Europe also creates several avenues for Western institutions to affect Polish domestic and foreign policy. In particular, the EU and NATO have been able to demand certain policy adjustments before Poland's membership in these organizations is even considered. NATO has encouraged continued military reform, particularly in the area of civil-military relations and command-and-control structures. The EU has been particularly effective in promoting reform of Poland's business law, internal regulations, and official standards for goods and services.
In a more general way, these institutions have managed to keep Poland's reforms from significant changes. Since much of the decision to admit or deny Poland to membership in Western institutions depends less on objective criteria than the opinions of policy elites in Western states, Polish leaders have been reluctant to take actions that would cause Western leaders to doubt the stability of Poland and its commitment to reforms. After Kwasniewski's election, the Polish press immediately sought comment from Western leaders and policy elites in Western institutions as to how the election of a post-communist president would affect Poland's chances for integration. This concern arises from the desire to keep Western leaders satisfied with Polish internal politics and policies.
Conclusions and Prospects for the Future
To summarize, the lack of political development and a still-unfavorable economy inside the country and a strongly developed international system with unusual leverage outside the country have combined to suppress policy change in Poland. As has happened over much of Poland's history, its internal political weakness or underdevelopment has given outside powers influence over internal policies. A combination of specific sociological, economic, political, and international factors has combined to keep governmental policy unusually consistent, especially in the face of harsh economic conditions, the lack of a well-developed political system, and frequent upheavals in the government.
Given the specific nature of the causes of Poland's policy stability, what are the prospects that this unusual condition will last? Surprisingly, over the short term, there are few indications that Poland will undertake a radical departure from previous policy. There has been little movement to unify its fractious parties on either the left or right. The IMF still holds a crucial role in Poland's continued economic progress, and it does not seem likely that Poland will be sufficiently recovered to do without Western credit even for a short period in the next several years. The EU and NATO still have no overriding incentive to admit Poland without insuring that it keeps to its reform program.
There are two important sources of change that will lead to greater policy shifts and independence in the middle to long term. The first source, as noted by Greskovits, is the economic improvement of the last two years, which is expected to continue for the near future. Poland is beginning to experience economic improvement to the point that populist economic policies will have more appeal. The second source is the increasing political development of the electorate in Poland. As noted above, the extreme candidates faired poorly in the 1995 election. Also, support for central, larger parties seems to be increasing. As the electorate grows more sophisticated, it will be better able to use the electoral system to express policy preferences.
Given the longer-term nature of these sources of change, it is likely that policy change and independence in Poland will begin gradually and take a period of time to develop, rather than the sudden shifts that have characterized Latin America, Asia or Europe's past. Some evidence of this trend can be seen. Privatization has slowed, pensions have been increased, and the more expensive aspects of military reform have been abandoned. In fact, after Kwasniewski took office, the government announced the purchase of militarily obsolete Iryda jets, which are incompatible with NATO systems. The official reforms and policy of integration are unchanged, but adjustments have begun in the details of implementation. This trend should continue as Poland goes through the growing pains of political maturation.
Bibliography
Greskovits, Béla,
"Dominant Economy, Subordinated Politics. The Absence of Economic Populism in the Transition of East-Central Europe." Sisyphus, 2(IX), 1993.
Lamentowicz, Wojtek,
"Prospects for Civil Society in Eastern Europe," in W. Weidenfeld and J. Janning, eds., Europe in Global Change. Gütensloli, 1993.
Nelson, Daniel N.,
"Democracy, Markets and Security in Eastern Europe," Survival 35, Summer 1993.
Simon, Jeffrey,
"Central Europe: 'Return to Europe' or Descent to Chaos?" Strategic Review, Winter 1993.
Valki, Laszlo, and Laszlo Czaba,
"Economic and Social Stability in Central and South-Eastern Europe: Preconditions for Security," Adelphi Papers, no. 284, January 1994.
Wprost,
nr. 43, 22 Oct. 1995.
Endnotes
1 Including the major proponent and best-known author of the plan, Jeffrey Sachs of Harvard University. [return to text]
2 Wprost, NR 43, 22 Oct. 1995. [return to text]
3 Wojtek Lamentowicz, "Prospects for Civil Society in Eastern Europe," in W. Weidenfeld and J. Janning, eds., Europe in Global Change. Gütensloli, 1993. [return to text]
4 Béla Greskovits, "Dominant Economy, Subordinated Politics. The Absence of Economic Populism in the Transition of East-Central Europe." Sisyphus, 2(IX), 1993. [Return to text]